Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1965

Miles Lorraine Miller and Irvine B. Miller v. Walker
Bank & Trust Co., Executor of the Last Will and
Testament of Nettie Knudsen Miller, Deceased,
and Viola Miller Carlson : Appellants' Reply Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.James W. Beless, Jr.; Attorney for Respondents
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Miller v. Walker Bank, No. 10272 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3518

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

, I

IN THE SUPREME COU.RT ·.
I

of the
STATE OF UTAH.

II

/·

',, ..
) 'i .

I

'

'J '

I•.,

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

.___________________________

1

ARGUMENT
I.

The will must be construed from its terms, and
clarity and certainty must prevail over ambiguities, uncertainty and pure guess. _______ ----·-·····-----········2

II.

The probate court had jurisdiction over the
estate upon appointment of the executrix and
could determine and adjudicate the res by its
subsequent decrees .... ·---·----···················-························
4

CONCLUSION ----·--······-·······-·······-···················-······························
7
AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES

Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106 P. 522, 37
····--·····-·-····-····5,
6, 7
L.R.A. (N.S.) 368 ·-------·---·-···-··········----·--·····
In re Gall's Estate, 15 Utah 2d 1, 386 P.2d 1065 .......................... 2, 3
Kennedy's Estate, 87 Cail. App. 2d 795', 197 P.2d 844................ 6
In re Mower, 93 Utah 390, 73 P.2d 967........................................ 2
Nelson v. Howells, 75 Utah 461, 286 P 631................................ 7
Weyant v Utah Savings & Trust Company, 54 Utah 181,
183 P. 189, 9 A.L.R. 1119........................................................ 6
STATUTES, TEXTS AND TREATISES

21 Am. Jur., Executors and Administrators, Sec. 12, p. 377.... 5
21 Am. Jur., Executors and Administrators, Sec. 487, p. 65'3.... 7
Bancroft Probate Practice (2nd Ed.), Sec. 7, p. 17.................... 6
Bancroft Probate Practice (2nd Ed.), Sec. 40, p. 107................ 5
1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, Sec. 5.11, p. 187........................ 2
Thompson on Wills, Sec. 8, p. 18.................................................... 2
Thompson on Wills, Sec. 224, p. 350................................................ 3
Utah Code Annotated 1953
3
74-1-36 ·································
··········-·········································
74-2-1
---------------------- ------------------------------------------·-------·------ 3
75-1-7 ---··-···-·-----·············-··························································4
7
Utah State Bar Title Standard No. 58 .... ·------··-···--····-·-·-················
7

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
.MILES LORRAINE MILLER and
IRVINE B. MILLER,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
WALKER BANK & 'fRUST CO.,
Executor of the Last Will and Testament
of NETTIE KNUDSEN MILLER, Deceased, and VIOLA MILLER CARL-

Case No.

10272

SON,

Defendants and Appellants.
APPELLANT'S'REPLY BRIEF
PREILIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondents have now settled on an implied trust
theory-but they themselves confuse their own theory
by saying (Respondents' Brief, pages 5 and 15) that
Xettie Miller could not dispose of the property in question by will. There is absolutely no restriction of any
kind on Nettie in Miles' will. In any event, if she was a
trustee, she necessarily would have to have had power
to dispose of the property by sprinkling it among the
purported beneficiaries. This demonstrates clearly the
~onfusion, ambiguities and conjectures which respond-
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ent:::; now wish to write into the will. We call attention
to the 8irnpl(' language of Paragraph ~econd of the \\ill
(R. 45 and Appellants' Brief, (p. 3).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE WILL MUST BE CONSTRUED FROM ITS TERMS,
AND CLARITY AND CERTAINTY MUST PREY AIL OVER
AMBIGUITIES, UNCERTAINTY AND PURE GUESS.

'rhe law of wills and of probate is premised on tlw
need for clarity, certainty and definiteness of terms.
'rhe only rights under the law of wills are those given
by statute. In re Mower, 93 Utah 390, 73 P.2d 96i:
Thompson on Wills, Sec. 8, p. 18. The instrument as executed is the ultimate criterion-not conjectures as to
what a testator, now long deceased, might have wanted
or might have said, if we could now read his mind and
rewrite his will. See 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, Sec.
5.11, p. 187.
Our Court in In re Gall's Estate, 15 Utah 2d 1, 386
P. 2d 10G5, weighed the applicable statutes and held in
favor of the clear, certain and explicit. Respondents ask
that the Call case be reversed.
Respondents have said (Respondents' Brief, p. 14)
that ''Not only testator's words, but his lack of words
have a bearing upon ·what he had in mind when he signed
the instrument." We submit that the words of the will
an~ all that is in question. The will has no limitation upon
Nettie a:,; to any disposition by will or deed, and therr
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is no Pxpression of her right to use the property for
lwr own benefit, as suggl•sted by respondents. Nettie ree<'ived a devise of the entire residue, followed by words of
r/011/Jtful import. By the Call case, the clear devise was
paramount over any subsequ8nt ambiguous and equivocal
language which might conjure up thoughts or possible
intentions of the testator, if we could now read his mind.
'l'lw Call case spelled out the importance of certainty
and showed that in a choice between the application of a
general statute, namely, 7-1-2-1, UCA 1953, going to the
te.stator's general intent, and a specific statute, 74-1-36,
UCA 1953, determining and favoring a fee simple devise,
the latter, which makes for clarity and certainty, must
prevail.
The same choice, applied to the Miles Miller will,
under all existing law, can only be made in favor of an
unqualified fee simple devise to Nettie.
The rule of the Call case is restated in Thompson on
Wills, Sec. 224, p. 350, as follows:

"An absolute devise or bequest of property
in one clause of a will can not be qualified or cut
down by a later part of the will unless such later
part shows an equally clear intention to do so by
the use of words definite in their meaning or by
expressions which must be regarded as imperative.
"When an estate or interest is given in one
clause of a will by clear and specific terms, it can
not be cut down or taken away by raising a doubt
upon the extent and meaning of other clauses,
but only by equally clear and decisive words as
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those by which the estate or interest affected was
created, or l>y dear and undoubted implication
from the language used."
POINT II.
THE PROBATE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER
THE EST ATE UPON APPOINTMENT OF THE EXECUTRIX
AND COULD DETERMINE AND ADJUDICATE THE RES
BY ITS SUBSEQUENT DECREES.

The respondents compound their own dilemma and
confusion in their Second Point entitled "The Decree
of Distribution is in accordance with the Terms of the
·will and does not cut off the Interests of Respondents,"
by their following argument that the decree deprived respondents of rights because of failure of due process for
the reason that no notice was given to respondents on the
petition for distribution, and that the decree was a nullity.
The Decree of Distribution in the simplest language
gave the entire residue of l\Iiles' estate to Nettie. The will
merged into the de>cree, and the decree became final when
not appealed from.
Respondents are squarely confronted in their argument as to ineffectiveness of the decree because of lack
of notice by a Utah statute and two landmark Utah case1
that have weathered the test of 56 years before thii
Court.
75-1-7, UCA 1953 is entitled "Jnrisdiction properly
acquired, irregularities do not invalidate subseque11I
orders wul decrees," and it provides first as to partiro
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dai!lling adnnwly to th(· title of the decedent, and then
as fol lows:
.. . . and in a probate matter in which a
competent court shall have appointed an executor,
administrator or guardian upon due notice, no
objection to any subsequent order or decree therein can be taken by any person claiming under the
dPeeased or under the ward, on account of any
~rnch want of noticP, defect or irregularity, in any
otlwr manner than on direct application to the
same court, made at any time before distribution
or on appeal."
Rarrl'ltc i:. Whitue.IJ, 3G Utah 574, 106 P. 522, 37
L.R.A. ( N .S.) 3G8, tested this statute, and our Court
lwld that probate proceedings are in rem; that the court
acquires jurisdiction of the property of the estate and
of all persons who have any interest in the property by
propt>r notice given on the appointment of the executor;
and that other notices provided for are not jurisdictional,
and disregard therefor is a mere irregularity and may
lw assailed, in absence of fraud, only in direct proceedings. Failure to give notice of final distribution was held
not to affect the validity of the decree of distribution,
except on direct proceedings. See 21 Am. Jur., Sec. 12,
p. 377, where the proposition is stated as a universal rule
that probate is a matter in rem, with jurisdiction had
ov0r tlw Pstate of decedent as the subject matter after
notice properly given on appointment of the executor.
Bancroft Probate Practice (2nd Ed.), Sec. 40, p. 107,
statPs thP rule as follows:
''A proceeding for the probate of a will or
for thP grant of letters of administration, is thus
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in the nature of a proceeding in rem, with th~
court obtaining jurisdiction of the real and personal estate of the deceased upon the appointment
of an executor or administrator ... A judgrnent
in probate is not against the persons as such,
but against or upon the thing or subject matter
itself, the status or condition of which is to be
determined. When rendered, the judgment is a
solemn declaration of the status of the thing,
ipso facto rendering it what it is declared to he.
"Where statutory notice has been given, all
who are interested in the estate, and, in fact all
the world, are bound by all orders or decrees duly
entered."

Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Company, 54 Utah
181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R. 1119, confirmed the Barrette
case and laid to rest the question of jurisdictional notiee
in probate in Utah.
Respondents argue that title vested on death of the
testator. This is true, subject to administration and to
adjudication and delineation of that title by the court
by its subsequent decree. Bancroft Probate Practice (2na
Ed.), Sec. 7, p. 17, states:
"Probate of wills is essential to the establish·
rnent of a record title in the beneficiaries, both 8.\
to real and personal property."

In Kennedy's Estate, 87 Cal. App. 2d 795, 197 P.2a
8-:U, the California Court held that title vests subject tii
administration and that the estate passes into the cu8tody
of the state to be by its agencies and instrumentalitie;
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111anaged until crf'ditors an• paid and the rights of devis(.'PS and h\'il's are established. That court said:
"While it re1JOses in such custody the court
is autlwrizf'd to dett•nnine the validft~- of wills
and of creditors' claims, the rights of rival heirs,
th<> nPcessity of sales and other incidents of winding up an estate."

21 Am. Jur., Sec. 487, p. 653.
Our Court in Nelson v. Howells, 75 Utah 461, 286 P.
G:ll, has hPld that the decree of distribution is the interpretation of the will.
SP<~

Showing the practical application of the Barrette
case and '75-1-7, uCA 1953, Title Standard No. 58 as
adopted by the Utah State Bar requires abstracting of
the proof of notice on the petition for letters testamentary and of the recording of the decrel~ of distribution.
~o othPr proof of notice on petitions subsequent to that
for appointment of the executor is required.
Jurisdiction was had over the notice properly given
on appointmf'nt of Nettie l\Iiller as executrix (R. 44).
The probate court thereafter adjudicated and determined
the titlP of the decedent by its decree of distribution.

CONCLUSION
The respondents are in fact and m effect asking
1·ewrsal of two landmark df'cisions of this Court, a repeal of li'l-1-7, UCA 1953, and a complete reversal of the
m rem theory of probate.
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We submit that the Probate Court had jurisdiction
over the Miller estate. Its decree of distribution was the
interpretation of th<> will, which merged into the decree.
The decree was final and not subject to collateral attaek.
'l'he judgment of the District Court should be re·
versed.
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES W. BELESS, JR.
416 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents

